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ABSTRACT Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are increasingly harmful to the cyberspace
nowadays. The attackers can now easily launch a bigger andmore challenging DDoS attack both towards and
with Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices, due to the fast popularization of them. Because of the characteristic
of fast overwhelming, it is important to make fast as well as accurate response to DDoS attacks, and the real-
time performance can be even more important to prevent and legitimate the attacks. Among the methods
proposed by researchers, the entropy-based detection method provides a sensitive and reliable performance.
However, the balance between computational complexity and recognition accuracy remains a challenge.
In this paper, we propose a detection method that consists of 3 main parts in different aspects: a sliding time
window to fasten the entropy calculation, a single-directional filter to realize early detection during the DDoS
progress but not after the crash, and a quintile deviation check algorithm to optimize the detection result.
These will eventually lead to a real-time and high-efficient performance to recognize IoT DDoS attacks as
soon as possible.
INDEX TERMS DDoS detection, IoT security, joint entropy, quintile deviation check, real-time detection,
sliding time window.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been decades since the Distributed Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) attack pattern first appeared [1], yet the DDoS
attacks are still huge challenges. Traditionally, a Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attack is characterized by an explicit attempt
by attackers to prevent the legitimate use of a service, and
a DDoS attack deploys multiple devices, usually millions of
devices, to attain this goal [2]. In September 2016, the website
of computer security consultant Brian Krebs was hit with
620 Gbps of traffic. The DDoS attacks can do much faster
and more severe harm to the Internet, yet the attacks can be
even stealthier than DoS attacks are. Due to the differences
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Zhenyu Zhou .
between DoS and DDoS, the defense strategies can be totally
different.
Unfortunately, the security situation is even more severe
especially in the era of Internet-of-Things (IoT) today. With
the up growing number of IoT devices, attackers can easily
take control of far more infected bots than ever before.What’s
more disturbing is that, the concepts of IoT, such as the
modern Internet of Vehicles [3], [4], edge computing [7] and
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) [5], [6] etc., are hav-
ing increasingly stronger computing power [8]. In late 2016,
Mirai [9], the ever largest IoT botnet, outbroke in 2016 and
launched a DDoS attack on 20th Sept., with the maximum
speed of 1.5 Tbps on OVH, the French web host and cloud
service provider, and launched another DDoS attack on a
DNSmanagement service provider in America, which caused
a large-area network paralysis in eastern United States. Many
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American websites, including Twitter and Facebook, failed
to be accessed by their domain names. In the offline event
in Germany, attackers launched a flood scan on 7,547 port
with Mirai, about 900,000 Deutsche Telekom routers crashed
during the campaign, resulting in a large scale of limited
network access. In late November 2017, a Mirai variant was
found launching attacks on IoT devices in Argentina through
port 23 and 2323 [10]. Besides Mirai, there already exist
many IoT botnets such as QBOT, Luabot, Bashlight, Zollard,
Remaiten, KTN-RM, etc., and most of them provide the
DDoS service. In fact, few IoT viruses exclude the function
of DDoS because IoT is perfect to launch a DDoS attack,
making the DDoS more threatening.
In an original DDoS attack, the attacker controls a huge
number of devices and threads to directly consume the
resources of the victim servers. A Direct DDoS Attack itself
is simple to understand and realize, but the attacker must
prepare an attacking network to manage and control all the
devices by adopting a botnet or a Trojan virus, which enriches
the cost of an attack. To avoid this problem, or to make the
attack more dangerous, the strategy of (Amplified) Reflective
Attack is proposed. In a reflective DDoS attack, the attacker
takes advantage of the vulnerabilities of those protocols
which make more responding resources than requesting ones,
such as DNS, NTP, SSDP, etc. The attacker designs and sends
some fake request packets, which are claimed to be sent
from the victims to the servers running those reflective proto-
cols. Usually, the servers won’t check whether the source IP
addresses are valid or real and will send the query results to
the victim IP addresses.
In another classification of flow quantity, DDoS attacks are
divided into Volumetric attacks and Low and Slow attacks.
Volumetric attacks are the traditional type of DDoS, and
they overwhelm the targets by consuming network, stor-
age or computing resources. Huge Volume DDoS attacks
send a high amount of traffic or request packets to a targeted
network or device to overwhelm its bandwidth capabilities,
connection limit or other network resources. In contrast, Low
and Slow attacks, also known as low-rate DDoS attacks
(LDDoS) or SlowDDoS attacks, are mainly based on the vul-
nerabilities of layer-7 protocols and involve ‘‘what appears
to be legitimate traffic at a very slow rate’’ [11] to occupy
and consume the connections. The earliest Slow DDoS is
SlowLoris [12], and it is first released by Robert ‘‘RSnake’’
Hansen in June 2009, which allows a single machine to take
down another machine’s web server with minimal bandwidth
and side effects on unrelated services and ports.
Generally, Slow DDoS attacks can go through Volume
DDoS detectors, because their packets are usually valid and
real, and cause few volume or number of requests, so some
researchers claim that Slow DDoS attacks are more techni-
cally superior, more dangerous and stealthier than volume
attacks. We used to believe that as well, but the reports and
data show the result. As is shown in the DDoS Threat Report
2018 Q3 [13], ‘‘The maximum attack size increased 139.84%
Year-over-Year to 118Gbps’’, and in the Nexusguard Threat
FIGURE 1. Ranking of different-type ddos attacking vectors [14].
Report (DDoS) 2019 Q3 [14], the top attacking vectors
are DNS Amplification, HTTP(S) Flood and TCP SYN
Flood, as shown in Fig. 1. Since the Huge Volume DDoS
attack is still one of the biggest threats in cyberspace and
is turning its attacking mode into a brand-new faster one,
it is necessary to make the detection more efficient and
flexible.
Volume DDoS attacks flood the target in the hopes of
slowing or stopping their services. There are 3main statistical
characteristics of the DDoS traffic:
1) Huge traffic size. As in the big data era today, the
in-out traffic of a personal web server can easily come to
1000’s of Mbps, and when a DDoS attack occurred, typically,
the request sizes are in the 100’s of Gbps, and reports show
that recent attacks have scaled to over 1Tbps.
2) Various source info. Not only does the source Port vary,
but the source IP address also varies in a wide range. Usually,
the attackers will use the fast-flux technology [15] and an
IP/MAC pool for IP spoofing, or will simply generate fake
packet heads for those non-source-IP-check protocols. Con-
sidering the huge size of network traffic, the range of values
can be shocking.
3) Take the effect quickly. The DDoS attack will arouse a
huge number of traffic or requests and crash the target victim
in a short duration, which means there will be little interac-
tion time for the detection and following defense against the
attack.
In this paper, we focus on fastening the detection of volume
type DDoS and designed a real-time alarming system. The
contribution of this paper is described as follows:
1) We optimize the method of sliding time window to
fasten the entropy calculation algorithm;
2) We design a Quintile Deviation Check algorithm to
identify the attacks;
3) We redefine a temporal indicator to evaluate the time
performance of DDoS detection.
With the 3 contributions, we realize a real-time volumetric
detection scheme for DDoS in the Internet of Things.
36192 VOLUME 8, 2020
J. Li et al.: RTVD Scheme for DDoS in the IoT
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the related works on the usage of the sliding
time window and DDoS detection methods. In Section III,
we list the nomenclature of all the terms, abbreviations and
mathematical symbols used in the following paragraphs.
In Section IV, we discuss the detection architecture as well
as the mathematical theories that our detection is based on.
And we set 3 subsections to explain the concepts of Traf-
fic Processor, Entropy Calculator, and Detection & Alarm
Module in detail. In Section V, we make simulations on
3 public datasets and a generated dataset to prove and evaluate
the detection scheme we propose. In Section VI, we con-
clude the whole paper and point out the direction of future
research.
II. RELATED WORKS
Research works have been done with various strategies to
detect DDoS attacks with sliding time window or information
entropy methods in recent years.
Early in 2006, the slidingwindowwas used in DDoS detec-
tion in [16]. The authors use two adjacent non-overlapping
windows: the referenced sliding window and the test slid-
ing window, and use an autoregressive model to recognize
anomalous traffic. Reference [18] mentioned a real-time
DDoS detection technique, using a sliding window and
source IP clusters, and using Spark to meet the distributed
demands. In years before the DDoS attacks had the charac-
teristics of a relatively fixed number of packets per second,
packet bytes, gap periods, etc. However, the situation has
changed and the technique of source IP cluster technique
won’t work as well as before, but other parts of the research
provide many inspirations.
In [19], the authors propose a new two-step method for
DDoS attack detection, which combines the approaches
of network traffic entropy and the TSK Fuzzy System
(TSK-FS), and shows that the TSK-FS DDoS detector
reaches enhanced sensitivity and robustness in the detec-
tion process. Reference [20] shows a method to identify
DDoS attacks by computing entropy and frequency-sorted
distributions of selected packet attributes. The authors also
use the sliding window to simplify the computation of the
entropy, which fastens the calculation, but they didn’t dis-
cuss the aspect of accuracy in detail. In [21] the authors
study information-theoretic methods to detect intrusions in
the network. They consider the usage of entropy, condi-
tional entropy and information gain to help partition and
setting parameters for existing detection models. On this
basis, Virmani et al. proposed an entropy deviation method
for network intrusion analysis [22]. They used the variation
value of source IP entropy packet-by-packet to classify the
benign (trusted) and malicious IP addresses. Reference [17]
presented a DDoS attack detection and mitigation system
with Software Defined Network (SDN). They collected the
network traffic information using the SDN controller and
sFlow agents in advance and then identified abnormal net-
work traffic with an entropy-based method and a Support
TABLE 1. TFOR of different DDoS attacks using QuinDC.
VectorMachine (SVM) classifier. Other researches also men-
tioned detection or mitigation methods such as Threat Intel-
ligence (TI) information sharing [23] and command lines
analysis [24].
Based on all the researches above, entropy works well
in the DDoS detection scenario, but the balance between
efficiency and accuracy is a big challenge. The mentioned
reference [20] uses a sliding window to optimize the time
performance, and base on that, our research in this paper does
further progress.
III. NOMENCLATURE
To make a clearer expression, in this section, we list all the
terms, abbreviations and mathematical symbols that are used
in the following paragraphs, as well as their descriptions and
definitions.
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FIGURE 2. DDoS detection architecture.
IV. DETECTION ARCHITECTURE AND
MATHEMATICAL THEORIES
The detection system consists of 3 parts: a traffic proces-
sor, an entropy calculator, and a detection module, and the
architecture is shown in Fig. 2. The traffic processor monitors
the traffic in the whole network, preprocesses the traffic data
and then forwards the data to the entropy calculator. The
entropy calculator calculates the real-time entropy values
and sends the values to the detection module. The detection
modulematches the entropy values with the given riskmodels
and decides whether to send out an alarm. In the following
sections, we will introduce the mechanism and theories of the
3 parts in detail.
A. TRAFFIC PROCESSOR
1) MONITORING AND THE TIMESTAMP
ATTACHED 5-TUPLES
Due to the existence of security vulnerabilities in traditional
network architectures, DDoS attacks are becoming increas-
ingly dangerous. To contain the consequence and also to trace
the attacks, the industry and academia proposed the concept
of software-defined network (SDN), whose centralized con-
trol network provides support for the defense against DDoS
attacks [25]. Within an SDN environment, we can trace and
filter the DDoS traffic, can get the traffic packet in real-time
and can make real-time detection and defense.
Since we can get real-time traffic packets, the next thing
that matters most is to extract the concerned segments
from the input data. The traditional Request-For-Comments
(RFC)-defined traffic identifier is the 5-Tuple [26], [27]:
[Source IP, Source Port, Destination IP, Destination Port, Pro-
tocol]. Analysts use 5-tuples to distinguish between different
FIGURE 3. Flow chart of single directional packet filter.
network flows. Using 5-tuple only will lose time-domain
characteristics. To solve this problem, we also append the
timestamp of each packet to the tuple as the expiring threshold
variable.
2) SINGLE DIRECTIONAL PACKET FILTER
A complete DDoS attack can be divided into 3 stages of
preparing, attack accumulating, and saturation. The attack-
ers collect the necessary information and intelligence of the
target victims and deploy botnets of Trojans during the prepa-
ration stage. After the preparation, the attackers send out a
command to launch the attack. As the connection numbers,
network resources or computing resources are being gradu-
ally occupied, the service capacity keeps declining, and the
victims will finally be unable to respond. Most detection
methods are based on this characteristic, but this means the
attackers have already fulfilled their goals. If we want to pre-
vent the attack before the victims paralyzed, we must further
shorten the responding time and latency. However, another
problem is that, during the accumulating stage. the victim
server can still make responses to the packets, including the
malicious ones.Wewill not only see the victims’ IP addresses
in the destination IP segment but also see as many attackers’
and legal users’ IP addresses as well. This will lead to a
failure in applying entropy detection until the attack enters
the saturation stage.
To eliminate the influences from the victims’ response
packets, a popular approach is to use flow information instead
of packet information, because the network traffic flow will
keep only the first packet in the flow. However, this will also
lead to false statistical characteristics. Popular flow extractors
(e.g., bro and tshark) usually work on a captured pcap file and
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FIGURE 4. LOIC-TCP-SYN flood packets (screenshot from Wireshark).
loses real-time capability. In this paper, we propose a single
directional packet filter and tried to advance the detection to
the attack accumulation stage. Fig. 3 describes the flow chart
of the filter.
The filter takes every sent-in 5-tuple as an input, and
only allows the tuples whose direction is the same with the
first tuple of a flow to pass. The filter maintains a list to
record the identifier of every flow. We reform each 5-tuple
into a 3-part array[Src:[S_IP, S_Port], Dst:[D_IP, D_Port],
P:Protocol], and whenever a 5-tuple is sent in, the filter first
check whether [Src, Dst, P] or [Dst, Src, P] is already in the
list. If [Src, Dst, P] doesn’t exist, append [Src, Dst, P] into the
list; else if [Src, Dst, P] exists, let the tuple pass the filter; else
drop it.
Figure 4 shows a beginning part of an accumulation stage
of a LOIC TCP SYN Flood DDoS attack. The attackers’
IP range is 1.1.0.0/16, while the victim servers’ IP fall
in 1.200.0.0/24. In the example, we can easily notice that
the distribution of source information and destination infor-
mation becomes unexpectedly the same, and we are unable
to locate the attacking event until we remove the response
packets.
B. ENTROPY CALCULATOR
Entropy theory is effective in DDoS detection because when
an attack occurs, the IP addresses and port numbers of the
malicious traffic are provided by thousands of millions of
different hosts that are fake, virtual or illegally controlled,
while under legal usage. However, they would be confined to
a relatively small range, and that will show a sharp contrast
from the entropy perspective.
1) OPTIMIZED SLIDING TIME WINDOW
H (X ) = E[− log p(xi)] = −
n∑
i=1
p(xi) log p(xi) (1)
The entropy value can directly represent the distribution of
information, but according to Shannon’s original entropy
formula (1), if we take all accumulated data as the input,
whenever we receive new input, we have to recalculate the
entropy. The time complexity of the original algorithm is
O(n2), which will cause unacceptable responding time in
DDoS detection. To avoid this disadvantage, Feinstein et al.
use the sliding window while computing [20] and reduce the
time complexity extremely from O(n2) to O(w2) = O(1),
where w is a constant value and is less than n. Because
the series of entropy value describes the trend of the value
distribution, the input values that have arrived too long before
should have few influences on the current input. Therefore,
we can set a proper constant width of a sliding window, i.e.
104 packets, and apply the sliding window to the input values
to calculate the entropy. Comparing with (1), the upper bound
of i is limited to be less than or equal to the width w. The
methodmakes it possible to apply entropy to DDoS detection,
but the response time can be further reduced. Taking the result
as a basis, we propose 2 methods to further reduce the time
complexity.
a: VARIATION UPDATING METHOD
The calculation of the entropy is accumulative. If we apply a
sliding time window, we can only recalculate the information
content of both the slide-out and slide-in elements, and keep
most other unaffected elements the same, thus simplifying
the calculation. Supposing that there is an input sequence
s[0 : 5] = [x1, x2, x1, x1, x3, x4], and the width of the sliding
window is w = 5. Then it is easy to calculate the entropy of
the first sliding window:
H (x[0 : 4])
= h(x1)+ h(x2)+ h(x3)
= −
3
5
· log
3
5
−
1
5
· log
1
5
−
1
5
· log
1
5
(2)
When the window slides forward by a step, the entropy
becomes:
H (x[1 : 5])
= h(x1)+ h(x2)+ h(x3)+ h(x4)
= −
2
5
· log
2
5
−
1
5
· log
1
5
−
1
5
· log
1
5
−
1
5
· log
1
5
(3)
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Giving a subscript of [0 : 4] to the information contents in
(2) and [1 : 5] to those in (3), we can get the relation between
(2) and (3):
H (x[1 : 5]) = H (x[0 : 4])− h[0:4](x[0])+ h[1:5](x[0])
−h[0:4](x[5])+ h[1:5](x[5]) (4)
Let 1h(x) = h[1:5](x)− h[0:4](x):
H (x[1 : 5]) = H (x[0 : 4])+1h(x[0])+1h(x[5]) (5)
Using this method, the only thing to do is just to count how
many times do the slide-in-and-out elements appear within
the sliding time window, and the worst time complexity is
O(2∗w). Then we calculate the variation of their information
contents to update the entropy value, thus getting the gener-
alized (5) with the following hypothesis.
Given an n-length sequence S and a preset sliding window
width w (w < n), let H (x) be the entropy value of the x th w-
length subsequence of S (marked as Sx), and hx(e) be the
information content of an element e in Sx . The recurrence
formula of entropy writes:
H (x) =

∑
e∈S1
h(e) = −
∑
p(e) log p(e), x = 1
H (x − 1)+1hx(eOut )+1hx(eIn), x > 1
1hx(e) = hx(e)− hx−1(e), 1 ≤ x ≤ n− w+ 1 (6)
b: VALUE COUNTER DICTIONARY AND COUNTER MATRIX
Another realization is to build a dictionary to record the count
numbers of every distinct element at every sliding since the
very beginning. Taking the previous example, we now record
all the count numbers: 3 x1s, 1 x2 and 1 x3 and record the
result as a dictionary d = {x1 : 3, x2 : 1, x3 : 1} to make
the result formatted. Now we slide the time window, recount
the elements and append the new dictionary to the former one:
D =
[
{x1 : 3, x2 : 1, x3 : 1},
{x1 : 2, x2 : 1, x3 : 1, x4 : 1}
]
(7)
Because we preset the window width to be 5, it’s simple
to count the number of all elements. But the situation could
be worse as the w goes larger. So we set another variable X
to record the to-be-slide-out element. In the example, we set
X = x1, and after we slide we update the counting number
of x1 from 3 down to 2, and then check whether the newly
slide-in element x4 already exists.
D =
[
d1 = {x1 : 3, x2 : 1, x3 : 1},
d2 = d1 + {x1 : −1, x4 : 1}
]
(8)
The dictionaries of the whole sliding window can be
described in an array: D =

d1
d2
. . .
dw
. Furthermore, D can be
transformed into a counting matrix of C =

v1
v2
. . .
vw
, where vi
is the value vector of di. In the example above, the matrix is
C =
[
3 1 1 0
2 1 1 1
]
. The entropy calculation formula can now be
written in a matrix format:
H [i] = −
vi
w
· log
viT
w
, 1 ≤ i ≤ w (9)
Or:
H [C] = −
C
w
· log
CT
w
(10)
2) JOINT ENTROPY
When aDDoS attack occurs, we usually see a sharp climbing-
up of the entropy of source IP and Ports because of the huge
amount of distributed attacking devices. But the situation
may be opposite if the target devices are so weak that they
can be easily taken down by a few attacking nodes, or the
attack is launched by some old-but-still-effective DDoS tools
such as ddosim [28]. On the other point of view, we will
see a sharp decline of the entropy of destination IP until the
number of attack packets reaches the width of the entropy
sliding window, and this is a traditional and the most popular
detection basis. But actually, the result will be interfered with
by some indicators such as the target numbers, policies that
motivate traffic to burst up, which is called ‘‘a benign flash
crowd’’ in Zhao’s research [19], etc.
To solve these problems, we combine both source and
destination segments and apply joint entropy to the timestamp
attached 5-tuples. We use the joint couple of (s_IP, s_Port)
instead of the source IP and source port, and then make it
joint with destination segments as our final detection basis.
We mark (s_IP, s_Port) as s and (d_IP, d_Port) as d , and the
final detection basis can be written as (s, d), so that the fake
going-down of source IP can be eliminated.
C. DETECTION AND ALARM MODULE
1) BACKGROUND TRAFFIC FILTER
We can now easily find the beginning of attacks even by
our eyes, but in practice, the terrible jitters can confuse the
computers. It is necessary to eliminate the influences of
background noise. Because the entropy values are contin-
uous time series, we can use a Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) model to predict the following entropy values. The
LSTM [29], [30] is an artificial Recurrent Neural Network
(RNN) architecture. Unlike standard Feedforward Neural
Networks, LSTM has feedback connections and can take
past inputs into the calculation, which makes it capable to
deal with sequence prediction missions. Bloomberg Business
Week wrote: ‘‘These powers make LSTM arguably the most
commercial AI achievement, used for everything from pre-
dicting diseases to composing music’’ [31]. We preset lb as
the number of the previous values that LSTM model looks
back, send the first lb values as the input sequence, and get a
predicted output value p. Then we repeat the process, pump
p into the bottom of lb sequence and pop out the top value,
send it to LSTM and get the second p value, and so on.
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FIGURE 5. Interval division of QuinDC.
2) QUINTILE DEVIATION CHECK ALGORITHM
As we’ve got the pre-processed and real-time entropy values,
the next thing to do is to make an immediate check and
alarm for the suspicious packets. There are many deviation
check algorithms: Quartile Deviation [32], [33], Generalized
Extreme Studentized Deviate (GESD) [34], Linear Regres-
sion, Confidence Interval, etc. In this paper, we concern more
about the sensitivity, and the values are nearly continuous,
so we decide to redesign the Quartile Deviation algorithm.
Quartile Deviation departs ascending sequence values into
4 equal-length subintervals and marks the 3 quartile points
as Q1(25%), Q2(50%) and Q3(75%). The deviation value is
Q3-Q1, which means 50% of the values are in [Q1, Q3], and
the maximum deviation is Q3-Q1.
We made a great modification to the original Quartile
Deviation algorithm, and name it as Quintile Deviation Check
(abbr. QuinDC). Since we have to consider both directions
of the curve trend, we extended the number of subinter-
vals to 5 unequal-length subintervals and named them as
Divergent Interval (Upward), Shock Interval (Upward), Con-
vergent Interval, Shock Interval (Downward) and Divergent
Interval (Downward) as shown below. The core parameters
of QuinDC is the previous average value e and the previous
radius value r (half of the value of which in traditional
Quartile Deviation algorithm). We set e as the central basis
of every test data, and determine the division points with
e, e ± r and e ± 2r . If a value falls in the interval of [e −
r, e+ r], we mark it as ‘convergent’; if it falls in the interval
of [e − 2r, e − r] or [e + r, e + 2r], we mark it as ‘shock’;
and if it is larger than e+2r or less than e−2r , then we mark
it as ‘divergent’. Those divergent values are what we concern
about, and we can then turn to research what kind of data
shows abnormal behavior. We introduce 3 new parameters,
N , k and φ to solve this problem.
As is shown in Fig. 5, we apply an N -length sliding win-
dow here and divide the N-length sequence into k-length
groups in the pattern shown in Fig. 6. Generally, N cannot
be divided by k , so we just get rid of the beginning N%k
values. Because the sequence or array is checked with a
FIGURE 6. The group division diagram of QuinDC.
sliding window, this operation won’t cause a bad affect on the
result.
Finally, we set φ as the threshold of the alarm trigger, and
summarize the following two alarm principles:
1) Monotonicity: The average value of all groups must be
monotonic.
2) Divergency:φ of the values in the slidingwindow should
be in the divergent intervals determined by the first φ of the
sliding window in the previous step. The system will send out
an alarm as soon as the 2 principles are both met.
V. SIMULATION AND EVALUATION
A. DATASETS SELECTION
In this paper, we use 3 public datasets and a generated dataset
for testing. The public datasets are the 1999 DARPA Intru-
sion Detection Evaluation Data Set [35]–[37], 2009 DARPA
DDOS Dataset [38], and the UNB CIC DDoS 2019 Eval-
uation Dataset [39]. The generated dataset is an emulation
SDN-environment DDoS attack traffic generated by IXIA
traffic simulator [40]. The 1999 & 2009 DARPA datasets are
classical in DDoS evaluation. The CIC DDoS 2019 dataset
is the newest dataset that including more modern attacking
methods than the previous two datasets. The IXIA dataset is
used as a supplement for testing the real-time performance in
the SDN environment.
The DARPA datasets mainly provide TCP SYN Flood
attack traffic, while in the CIC dataset, there are much
more types of DDoS traffic: Network Time Protocol (NTP),
Domain Name System (DNS), Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP), MSSQL, NetBIOS, Simple Network Man-
agement Protocol (SNMP), Simple Service Discovery Pro-
tocol (SSDP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP), UDP-Lag,
WebDDoS, SYN, Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP), etc.
The IXIA BreakingPoint network tester simulates different
DDoS attack scenarios and sends out the traffic packets. In the
dataset, the types of DDoS attacks consist of generated simple
attacks (such as SYN Flood, UDP Flood, and HTTP Flood)
and simulated toolkit attacks (such as TCP and UDP attacks
with different frequencies, background traffics or traffic-peak
values).
B. SIMULATION OF RTVD DETECTION
Traditionally, we will see the entropy curves of source IP
and destination IP in a volumetric DDoS like the black and
VOLUME 8, 2020 36197
J. Li et al.: RTVD Scheme for DDoS in the IoT
FIGURE 7. Joint entropy curves.
red curves shown in Fig. 7a, which describe the entropy
changes from the occurrence of the attack to its saturation
status. But if there are some indicators of specific attacking
methods or legal flash crowd etc., like the black and red
curves shown in Fig. 7b, it can be difficult to tell when to use
the source IP or the destination IP for detection. But after we
apply the joint entropy, as the blue curves shown in Fig. 7a
and Fig. 7b, the situations become unified. So far, the data
preparation has been completed.
Now we realize the IoT background packet filter. Fig. 8
shows the real entropy data and its LSTM-predicted data.
We can see irregular but legal (for these entropy comes from
benign background traffic without any attack) serrations in
the real blue entropy line and the highly-coincident predicted
red line. We let the LSTM prediction model continuously
predict the future entropy with a benign input. Then, we still
use a sliding time window, pump the predicted value into
the input sequence, then pop out the oldest value. Therefore,
the prediction keeps going on.
FIGURE 8. Background entropy filter using LSTM.
Since we’ve got the prediction entropy values of the back-
ground traffic, we can make a subtraction to eliminate the
background noise, thus cutting down the false alarm rate.
C. EVALUATION
We’ve already been able to receive the traffic from an IoT
network and calculate the real-time entropy values of that
traffic. The only thing to do is to use QuinDC to find when the
attacks occur. Before the final detection, we first made several
tests to decide the optimal parameters N , k, φ in QuinDC.
We select the traditional Receiver Operating Characteristic
(RoC) indices of False Positive Rate (FPR) and False Posi-
tive Rate (FPR) to evaluate the QuinDC performance under
different parameters.
TPR =
TP
TP+ FN
FPR =
FP
FP+ TN
(11)
Generally, the TPR will raise together with the FPR from
both 0% to near both 100%, and we hope to find the point
where the TPR is as high as possible, and the FPR is as
low as possible in the meanwhile. That is to say, what we
want is the certain combination of (N , k, φ) that makes the
point of (TPR, FPR) closest to the top-left point in the
coordinates. In Fig. 9, there are three RoC curves represent
IXIA SYN Flood, CIC 2019 DDoS Dataset and DARPA
1999 DDoS Dataset. Since We succeeded in detecting all
the DDoS attacks listed in the dataset providers’ attacking-
timeline files, so we turn to evaluate the TPR and FPR with
how many ’attacking packets’ will QuinDC identify or omit.
According to the result shown in Fig. 9, the best parameter
combination is: N = 500, k = 100, φ = 0.4, which
means the width of a QuinDC sliding window is 500 packets,
the group size is 100 packets, and at least 40% of the values in
a sliding window should fall in the IDU which is determined
by the first 40% values in the previous sliding window.
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TABLE 2. TFOR of different DDoS attacks using QuinDC.
FIGURE 9. The RoC curves of datasets under different N,k, φ.
The TPR of modern DDoS detection is 100%, and the TPR
of attacking packets detection is over 90%, with a low FPR of
less than 3%. Furthermore, we redesigned another indicator
of Temporal False Omission Rate (TFOR) (10) to evaluate
the time performance of response. Traditionally, researchers
will use a False Omission Rate (FOR) to evaluate the rate of
omitted positive samples.
FOR =
FN
FN + TN
(12)
However, in this paper, we do not care about the other
positive samples but want to know how fast can we find the
first true attack packet. So we modified (12) and added the
temporal variables, and get the TFOR formula as (10).
TFOR =
Alarm Delay
Alarm Delay+ Elapsed Benign Duration
(13)
With this revision, we can evaluate a detection scheme to
be sensitive and fast with a lower TFOR value. If the system
FIGURE 10. TFOR of different DDoS attacks using QuinDC.
recognizes an attack at its first attacking packet, then the value
of Alarm Delay is 0, and the TFOR will be 0%. Otherwise,
with the sliding window running, if the system fails to recog-
nize any of the attacking packets, then the TFOR value will
raise up and finally reach 100% because there are no packets
before the attack and the value of Elapsed Benign Duration
is 0. We simulate different types of DDoS attacks from the
4 datasets, and the TFOR results are shown in Fig.10 and
listed in detail in Table 2. Most TFOR are less than 0.5% and
have an average TFOR of 0.344765%. Also, the scheme can
recognize all the volumetric DDoS attacks in an average delay
of 0.015172 second.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we optimized the joint entropy calculation pro-
cess and designed the algorithm of Quintile Deviation Check
(QuinDC) to realize RTVD: a real-time volumetric detection
scheme for DDoS in the Internet of Things. The techniques
of sliding window, timestamp attached 5-tuple, and single
directional packet filter make it possible to do entropy calcu-
lation in real-time. Furthermore, the QuinDC provides a low-
latency and accurate performance, so that it can be applied
in systems with the real-time requirement, such as intrusion
defense systems in IoT environments. In future research,
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we will try to use LSTM or GRU for directly IoT DDoS
detection, and focus on the Slow DDoS, as well as real-time
volumetric DDoS taxonomy.
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